Abstract-This paper studies secure unicast communication over a network with uniform wiretap sets and shows that, when network nodes can independently generate randomness, determining the secrecy capacity is at least as difficult as the k-unicast network coding problem. In particular, we show that a general k-unicast problem can be reduced to the problem of finding the secrecy capacity of a corresponding single unicast network with uniform link capacities and any one wiretap link. We propose a low-complexity linear optimization-based achievable strategy involving global random keys that can be generated anywhere in the network, and an efficient greedy algorithm that further improves achieveable rate by exploiting local random keys.
I. INTRODUCTION
The secure network coding problem, introduced by Cai and Yeung [1] , concerns information theoretically secure communication over a network where an unknown subset of network links may be wiretapped. A secure code prevents the wiretapper from obtaining information about the message being communicated. The secrecy capacity of a network, with respect to a given collection of possible wiretap sets, is the maximum rate of communication such that for any one of the wiretap sets the secrecy constraints are satisfied. Types of secrecy constraints studied in the literature include perfect secrecy, strong secrecy and weak secrecy. In the uniform setting, i.e. equal capacity links of which any z may be wiretapped, [1] showed that when only the source can generate randomness, the secrecy capacity is given by the cut-set bounds and linear codes suffice to achieve capacity. This paper considers the problem of finding the secrecy capacity of a network when we allow network nodes in addition to the source to generate independent randomness (i.e. randomness generated at different nodes is statistically independent). We show that a general k-unicast problem can be reduced to a corresponding single unicast secrecy capacity problem with uniform link capacities where any single link can be wiretapped. This implies that determining the secrecy capacity, even in the simple case of a single unicast and uniform wiretap sets of size 1, is at least as difficult as the long-standing open problem of determining the capacity region of multiple-unicast network coding, which is not presently known to be in P, NP or undecidable [2] .
The secure network coding problem in the non-uniform setting, i.e. restricted wiretap sets and/or non-uniform link capacities, has been considered by Cui et al. [3] , and by Chan and Grant [4] , who showed that determining multicast secrecy capacity with restricted wiretap sets is at least as difficult as determining capacity for multiple-unicast network coding. Our reduction is similar to the core ideas appearing in [4] with the following differences which significantly strengthen the result. First, by introducing the idea of key cancellation and replacement at intermediate nodes, our construction does not need to impose restrictions on which links can be wiretapped. Secondly, unlike the reduction in [4] which involves multiple terminals, ours only needs a single destination. Thirdly, while [4] studies perfect secrecy, our results apply to perfect, strong and weak secrecy constraints.
While finding the secure unicast capacity in the uniform setting is difficult, for this case we show a low-complexity linear optimization-based achievable strategy in which any network node may generate global random keys, i.e. random keys that are decoded by both the source and the sink. This approach generalizes the strategy in [1] , [5] where only the source generates global keys, and has lower complexity than the linear optimization-based strategies in [3] designed for the non-uniform case. Performance can be further improved by exploiting non-global keys. We propose an efficient algorithm that greedily searches for places where non-global keys can be introduced in place of global keys, thereby increasing the secure communication rate.
II. MODEL
A network is represented by a directed graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of vertices representing network nodes, and E the set of edges representing network links. Links have unit capacity (unless otherwise specified) and there may be multiple links between a pair of nodes. Each node i ∈ V can generate a random variable K i which is independent of random variables generated at other nodes (the rate of K i can be upper bounded by the sum of outgoing link capacities of i). Transmissions on the outgoing links of node i can be functions of K i as well as transmissions received on incoming links of i.
There is a source node S ∈ V and a destination node D ∈ V. S wants to communicate a message M , uniformly drawn from a finite alphabet set S n , to D using a code with length n. Then the rate of the code is n −1 log |S n |. We say that a communication rate R is feasible if there exists a sequence of length-n codes such that |S n | = 2 nR and the probability of decoding error tends to 0 as n → ∞.
For the secure network coding problem, we specify additionally a collection A of wiretap link sets, i.e., A is a collection of subsets of E such that an eavesdropper can wiretap any one set in A. We consider three kinds of secrecy constraints: the requirement, for all A ∈ A, that I(M ; X n (A)) = 0 corresponds to perfect secrecy; that I(M ; X n (A)) → 0 as n → ∞ corresponds to strong secrecy; and that I(M ;X n (A)) n → 0 as n → ∞ corresponds to weak secrecy, where X(A) = {X(a, b) : (a, b) ∈ A}, and X(a, b) is the signal transmitted on the link (a, b). We say a secrecy rate R is feasible if the communication rate R is feasible and the prescribed secrecy condition is satisfied. The secrecy capacity of the network is defined as the supremum of all feasible secrecy rates. In the rest of the paper we study the case that A is uniform, i.e., A = {A ⊂ E : |A| ≤ z}, where z is a specified maximum number of links that can be wiretapped.
III. MULTIPLE UNICAST REDUCTION
A. Reduction of multiple unicast to secure communication The following theorem reduces the multiple unicast network coding problem to the secure network coding problem with only a single unicast and uniform wiretap sets of size 1. Theorem 1. Given any unit rate K-unicast problem with source-destination pairs {(S i , T i ), i = 1, ..., K} on a network N , the corresponding secure communication problem in Figure 1 with unit capacity links, any one of which can be wiretapped, has secrecy capacity K (under perfect, strong or weak secrecy requirements) if and only if the K-unicast problem is feasible.
Proof. The secrecy capacity is upper bounded by the capacity K of the min cut from S to D.
"⇒" We show that feasibility of a weak secrecy rate of K implies feasibility of the K-unicast problem. Note that this extends immediately to the cases of strong and perfect secrecy because they imply weak secrecy.
Suppose a secrecy rate of K is achieved by a code with length n. Let M be the source input message, then H(M ) = Kn. Because there is no shared randomness between different nodes, M is independent with {d
By the chain rule,
where the last inequality holds because of (1) and
where n → 0 as n → ∞ and (4) is due to the cut set {c
where (6) holds because of (2), and (7) follows from (1) and (5). Also notice that (8) where
Here the first equality holds because {M, c n 1 } is independent with {f n i , i = 1, ..., K} and the second inequality holds due to the weak secrecy constraint. Therefore by (5), (8) and (9) we have
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where the last inequality invokes (14) and (12) . Notice that M is independent with {b
Now we bound the entropy of b n 1 . Consider the joint entropy,
where the last inequality holds because of (7), the secrecy condition H(M |c n 1 ) ≥ Kn − nδ n , and H(b
Finally, by (15) and (16),
The above argument extends to all other paths naturally (by renumbering the notations accordingly), so
Therefore ∀i = 1, ..., K, by the channel coding theorem, if we employ an outer code of length n by encoding b n i as a supersymbol, then there exists an inner code that achieves a rate of n − 8n n − 8nδ n from B i to T i , and so the overall rate is
Because B i can be viewed as a virtual source of S i , so ∀i = 1, ..., K, the unicast from node S i to T i of rate 1 is feasible. "⇐" We show that feasibility of the K-unicast problem implies achievability of secure communication rate K under perfect secrecy, which implies strong and weak secrecy. This rate corresponds to the cut set upper bound on secure communication rate.
Secrecy rate K is achieved by the scheme described in Figure 2 The above result can be easily extended to the case of zero error communication with perfect secrecy. In this case, we say a rate R is feasible if there exists a code with finite length n such that |S n | = 2 nR and the probability of decoding error is strictly zero. Then for the secrecy communication problem in Figure 1 , its zero error perfect secrecy capacity is K if and only if the K-unicast for source-destination pairs {(S i , T i ), i = 1, ..., K} of unit rate is feasible with zero error. The proof of this claim follows the same outline as the proof of Theorem 1, with the difference that all n and δ n become strictly 0. Then (15) implies that b Conversely to the reduction above, for any weakly or strongly secure communication problem, we can construct a communication problem without security constraints (which can in turn be reduced to an equivalent multiple unicast problem [6] ) that is feasible if and only if the secure communication problem is feasible. The constructed communication network, called the A-enhanced network and described in [7] , [8] , adds additional sinks with communication demands. The result for strongly secure communication follows from the equivalence of the capacity region for weak and strong security, shown in [9] .
IV. ACHIEVABLE STRATEGIES
While finding the secure unicast capacity is difficult, below we show a low-complexity linear optimization-based achievable strategy that generalizes the global key strategies in [1] , [5] by allowing all network nodes to generate randomness. We further propose an efficient algorithm that greedily searches for places where local keys (keys that not known to both the source and the sink) can be introduced in place of global keys, thereby increasing the secure communication rate.
A. Global Key Schemes
We consider a class of achievable secure coding schemes in which all random keys are global, i.e. decodable with zero error by both the source and the sink, and perfect secrecy is ensured by having global keys of total rate equal to z, the number of wiretapped links. An example is given in Let k i denote the rate of the random key generated by a node i ∈ V. A global key scheme corresponds to a multisource multicast with receiver nodes S and D, and with the following source nodes: node S which has rate R S + k S , and nodes i ∈ V, i = S which have rate k i . Since the capacity region of a multi-source multicast problem is given by cut set bounds [10, Theorem 2.3], the following linear program characterizes the optimal secure message rate achievable using a coding scheme within this class. Here, Λ t (U) denotes the collection of all cuts between U ⊂ V and t ∈ V in G, and I C denotes the capacity of a cut C.
The number of constraints in LP1 is exponential in the size of V. Since [10, Theorem 2.3] implies that a multisource multicast is feasible if it is feasible for each sink separately, which is equivalent to a multi-commodity flow, we can formulate the following equivalent linear program with number of constraints linear in |E|. In our network model each edge (u, v) ∈ E has capacity c(u, v) = 1.
fS(e), fD(e), f
Here f D and {f Proof. We consider an augmented network G obtained from G as follows. 1) Connect each subset A ∈ A to a virtual sink node D A observing all information on that set of links. Specifically, ∀(i, j) ∈ E, create node v i,j and replace (i, j) by two edges (i, v i,j ) and
A ), all of unit capacity. 2) Create a virtual message source v M which is connected to S by edge (v M , S) of capacity R * S . 3) Create a virtual key source v K which is connected to each node i ∈ V by an edge (v K , i) of capacity k i corresponding to the solution of LP2. 4) For every A ∈ A, let R v→A be the max flow (min cut) capacity from {v M , v K } to D
A . Note that this equals the max flow capacity from v K to each virtual sink D A , because v M has only one outgoing link (v M , S), the max flow capacity from v K to S is R w (since LP2 ensures that S decodes all keys), and R v→A ≤ z ≤ R w . 5) Connect the key source v K to each virtual sink D A with edge
, where R w = i∈V k i is the total key rate. Connect the message source v M to each virtual sink D A by edge (v M , D A ) of capacity R * S . Then consider the two-source multicast problem on G where S, D and the virtual sinks {D A } each demand rate R * S from message source v M and rate R w from the key source v K . The constraints in LP2 guarantee that the required flows exist for S and D, and by construction the additional edges from v M and v K guarantee this for each virtual sink D A . Therefore, the multicast network coding problem is feasible [10] . Furthermore, the total rate observed by each virtual sink D A is exactly equal to the sum R * S + R w of the message and key rates. This implies that in a capacity-achieving code for this multicast problem, the information received by each virtual sink D
A from set A must be independent of information received on the additional edges from v M and v K , which includes the entire source message. Therefore, this corresponds to a code achieving rate R * S for the original secrecy problem with perfect secrecy.
B. Greedy Local Key Enhancement
We describe an algorithm for acyclic graphs that greedily adds local keys to improve a given global key solution. c is the only sink, therefore the flow from S to D equals the min cut between them. Hence without loss of generality we assume R S + k S is the max flow from S to D.
If k S = 0, the global key scheme is already optimal. Otherwise, decompose f D into R S + k S edge-disjoint paths from the S to D, denoted by
where E L is the set of edges that is not used by any flows in LP2. We apply Algorithm 1 sequentially to each of these paths. Algorithm 1 has a similar structure as the labeling algorithm [11] used to search an augmenting path, but with the difference that it searches for a series of local key gadgets that covers every edge of a path P k . A local key gadget with respect to P k is either 1) a path from i to j, where i, j are nodes on P k , in which case local keys can be injected at i and transmitted to j, or 2) a path from a node v to i and a path from v to j, where v is not on P k while i, j are on P k . In this case local keys can be injected at v and transmitted to both i, j. Hence each gadget is associated with two nodes in P k and is able to protect the sub-path of P k between these two nodes. Furthermore, E k is introduced to allow the sub-paths to overlap. The virtual local key sources and additional links are introduced for reusing local keys on multiple paths. Intuitively, if Algorithm 1 returns a local key chain L k on P k then path P k is protected by a series of local keys. If Algorithm 1 returns local key chains on R S +1 paths among {P 1 , · · · , P R S +k S }, then we can transmit one less global key and one unit more message. Without loss of generality we assume the algorithm returns L 1 , · · · , L R S +1 on the first R S + 1 paths P 1 , · · · , P R S +1 .
Below we introduce a secure code that achieves rate R S +1. We first construct a code C that transmits R S + 1 units of message and z − 1 global keys as described in Section IV-A. Hence C achieves perfect secrecy if up to z − 1 links are wiretapped. Note that because the graph is acyclic, any edges on P i are used for the unicast to D and are not upstream of S, hence it suffices for C to perform routing on P i . For example, in the path-based approach in [12] , coding is not required at a link that is upstream of only one sink. Next we construct a code C that is identical to C except on P = {P 1 , · · · , P R S +1 }. For P k ∈ P, consider the gadgets in L k , each of them generates an independent local key and delivers the key to two nodes i, j ∈ P k . The upstream node i adds this local key to the incoming signal and sends the sum as the outgoing signal along P k . This signal travels downstream and the key is canceled when it reaches j. Such cancellation is possible because C performs routing on P. Therefore D can successfully decode.
Next we show C achieves perfect secrecy. Denote by E P the set of edges of the paths {P 1 , · · · , P R S +k S }, E c P as the set of edges used by any flows in LP2 except E P . Recall the augmented graph G used to construct C , and consider the subgraph G S of G by deleting all edges in E P and all unused edges (edges that carry no flows). Because R S + k S is the max flow from S to D, in G S there are no out-going edges from S (otherwise contradicts the fact that R S + k S is the max flow). So the min cut from the set of sources {v i : i ∈ V} ∪ {v M } to any t A in G S is at most z − k S , and therefore by the construction of C , any wiretap set A that does not include at least k S edges in E P is not effective, i.e., not leaking source message information. Hence without loss of generality we assume an effective wiretap set A includes at least k S edges in E P . By the construction of C , E P consists of R S +k S disjoint paths. Clearly A should eavesdrop distinct paths, and therefore by the pigeonhole principle, at least one path in P is wiretapped. Denote the wiretapped signal on this path as X 1 + V 1 , where X 1 is the original signal sent in C , and V 1 is one local key or a combination of them. Denote the remaining wiretapped signals as X 2 + V 2 , · · · , X z + V z , where V i , i ≥ 2 is either zero or a function of local keys. Note V 1 is a random variable uniformly drawn from a finite field and is independent of {M, X 2 , · · · , X z }. Therefore X 1 +V 1 also follows uniform distribution and is independent of {M, X 2 , · · · , X z }. So
Algorithm 1 Local Key Chain Search for P k Initialization set E k := {reversal of the edges of P k } unlabel all nodes set pred in (j) := 0, pred out (j) := 0, ∀j ∈ V\P k set pred(j) := (0, 0), ∀j ∈ P k set LIST in := ∅, LIST out := ∅ label S and set LIST P := {S} Label nodes that can be reached by gadgets while D is unlabeled and LIST P , LIST in and LIST out are not all empty do remove a node i from either LIST P , LIST in or LIST out if i is removed from LIST P or LIST out then for all (i, j) ∈ E L , j / ∈ P k do if j is not labeled IN then label j IN, set pred in (j) := i and add j to LIST in end for for all (j, i) ∈ E L , j / ∈ P k do if j is not labeled OUT then label j OUT, set pred out (j) := i add j to LIST out end for for all (i, j) or (j, i) ∈ E L , j ∈ P k do if j is not labeled P then label j P if (i, j) ∈ E L then set pred(j) := (i, IN ) else set pred(j) := (i, OU T ) end if add j to LIST P end if end for if i ∈ P k then for all (i, j) ∈ E k do if j is not labeled P then label j P, set pred(j) := (i, IN ) and add j to LIST P end for end if end if if i is removed from LIST in then for all (i, j) ∈ E L , j / ∈ P k do if j is not labeled IN then label j IN, set pred in (j) := i and add j to LIST in end for for all (i, j) ∈ E L , j ∈ P k do if j is not labeled P then label j P, set pred(j) := (i, IN ) and add j to LIST P end for end if if D is labeled then use predecessor pointers to trace back from D to S and obtain a set of edges L k consisting of local key gadgets Update G L set L k := L k \E k set E L := E L \L k partition L k into a collection of local key gadgets L k , ∀ gadget l ∈ L k , create in G L virtual local key source v l . ∀ node i visited by l, create link (v l , i) of unity capacity.
return local key chain L k end if end while and perfect secrecy is achieved. Figure 4 shows an example in which global key schemes achieve at most unit rate. With local key enhancement rate 2 is achieved. For path (S, A, D) the two non-overlapping gadgets are {(S, A)} and {(B, A), (B, D)}; for path (S, C, E, D) the two overlapping gadgets are {(E, S)} and {(B, C), (B, D)}. Local key V 2 and edge (B, D) are reused for both paths. Finally, message rate can be further increased by iteratively applying the above procedure to the resulting solution. At the a-th iteration, a < k S , if Algorithm 1 finds R S + a local keys chains protecting R S + a paths, then rate R S + a is feasible. Due to space limit we defer details to [7] .
